Accounting literature has commonly judged the impact of regulation on auditors’ ethical commitment by studying daily audit practice. We argue that the content of the regulations themselves is an important determinant of such an impact. This paper evaluates the capacity of the content of regulation to promote audit ethics by reference to the European Union’s audit policy. Anchored in the extant conceptual perspectives on ethics, our analysis of relevant policy documents shows that the EU’s approach to audit ethics relates most (...) strongly to the deontological perspectives on ethics and leaves largely unexplored other means of promoting auditors’ ethical stance, such as by stimulating virtue ethics. We find that it is the EU regulators’ restricted view of the conceptual foundations of audit ethics that limits the capacity of their policy to effectively stimulate auditors’ ethical commitment. The paper also discusses the potential implications of our analysis for the design of future audit policy. (shrink)

Everyday visual experience constantly confronts us with things we can interact with in the real world. We literally feel the outside presence of physical objects in our environment via visual perceptual experience. The visual feeling of presence is a crucial feature of vision that is largely unexplored in the philosophy of perception, and poorly debated in vision neuroscience. The aim of this article is to investigate the feeling of presence. I suggest that visual feeling of presence depends on the visual (...) representation of a very particular spatial relation with the object we interact with: the visual representation of absolute egocentric depth, which is due to stereoscopic vision. (shrink)

Ce travail traite des effets psychiques de la ménopause chez certaines femmes. L’auteur stipule que, bien qu’il engage principalement le corps, ce phénomène constitue une période propice à l’éclosion de diverses formes d’expression psychopathologique. Le sujet, abordé à partir d’une réflexion théorique soutenue par deux vignettes cliniques, a pour ambition de faire saisir que l’entrée de certaines femmes dans la ménopause peut induire un effondrement dépressif sous-tendu par une plainte singulière, celle de « ne plus pouvoir faire le ménage comme (...) avant ». Cette plainte renverrait ces femmes à la question du désir dans leur ménage, entendons « dans leur couple », et interrogerait les figures du narcissisme, du maternel, du féminin, etc. Ainsi, la ménopause dévoile les enjeux inconscients à l’œuvre dans la relation conjugale qui nécessitent d’être élaborés dans le transfert afin d’être sublimés. (shrink)

Embora influente na recepção de Heidegger nos Estados Unidos da América, o trabalho de Dreyfus foi repetidas vezes criticado por desenvolver uma leitura distorcida e seletiva da fenomenologia de Heidegger. Nesse artigo, mostramos que, independentemente de seus desenvolvimentos posteriores em ciência cognitiva, sua crítica inicial à IA simbólica se apoia em duas teses que podem ser localizadas em Ser e Tempo, a saber, de que nosso senso de situação é pragmático-holístico, e intrinsecamente relevante. Após uma introdução geral, reconstruímos, numa primeira (...) seção, em linhas gerais o projeto da IA simbólica e o tom geral da crítica de Dreyfus; numa segunda seção, reconstruímos a crítica de Dreyfus a SAM, de R. Schank; na terceira seção, indicamos como as duas teses podem ser localizadas em Ser e Tempo; concluímos apontando questões pendentes. (shrink)

Picture perception and ordinary perception of real objects differ in several respects. Two of their main differences are: Depicted objects are not perceived as present and We cannot perceive significant spatial shifts as we move with respect to them. Some special illusory pictures escape these visual effects obtained in usual picture perception. First, trompe l'oeil paintings violate : the depicted object looks, even momentarily, like a present object. Second, anamorphic paintings violate : they lead to appreciate spatial shifts resulting from (...) movement. However, anamorphic paintings do not violate : they are still perceived as clearly pictorial, that is, nonpresent. What about the relation between trompe l'oeil paintings and? Do trompe l'oeils allow us to perceive spatial shifts? Nobody has ever focused on this aspect of trompe l'oeil perception. I offer the first speculation about this question. I suggest that, if we follow our most recent theories in philosophy and vision science about the mechanisms of picture perception, then, the only plausible answer, in line with phenomenological intuitions, is that, differently from nonillusory, usual picture perception, and similarly to ordinary perception, trompe l'oeil perception does allow us to perceive spatial shifts resulting from movement. I also discuss the philosophical implications of this claim. (shrink)

According to the received view in the philosophical literature on pictorial perception, when perceiving an object in a picture, we perceive both the picture’s surface and the depicted object, but the surface is only unconsciously represented. Furthermore, it is suggested, such unconscious representation does not need attention. This poses a crucial problem, as empirical research on visual attention shows that there can hardly be any visual representation, conscious or unconscious, without attention. Secondly, according to such a received view, when looking (...) at a picture aesthetically, one both consciously represents and visually attends to both the depicted object and the picture’s surface simultaneously. Thus, contra the empirical research on attention, only conscious visual representations are coupled, by such current view, with attention. And this clearly poses a second problem, as this philosophical account is not in tune with what vision science tells us about the functioning of our visual system. Furthermore, this raises another crucial problem, namely, that of explaining why aesthetic experience of pictures does not feel odd or conflicting, since, as previously noted in the philosophical literature, and contra the received view, if we are simultaneously consciously perceiving both the picture’s surface and the depicted object, there seems to be two things, at the same time, in the foreground of one’s visual consciousness. But, if so, as suggested, this would lead to a conflicting spatial visual experience. This paper offers a new description of the role of visual attention in picture perception, which explains the difference between the usual and the aesthetic way of perceiving a depicted object, without facing the problems reported above. A crucial role in our new account is played by the notion of unconscious attention, the distinction between focal and distributed, as well as top-down and bottom-up visual attention and the relationship between visual attention and visual consciousness. The paper, thus, offers the first theory concerning the exercise of visual attention in pictorial perception that is both philosophically rigorous and empirically reliable. (shrink)

This book argues that we can find the resources to build a public perspective if we make two commitments: to respect people as autonomous agents and to endorse a shared ethics of beliefs.

The main aim of this paper is to analyze the relationship between brain and language in terms of coevolution. Nowadays, the thesis of coevolution is defended by the exponents of the neoculturalist paradigm to claim that language is the product of cultural evolution. In our opinion, this claim is misleading. From our point of view, in fact, we can refer to the relationship between brain and language in terms of coevolution only if we are prepared to maintain that language is (...) the product of natural selection. In our opinion, in other words, the coevolution thesis involves the idea of language as biological adaptation. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to justify the role of mental imagery in creativity. In more specific terms the central idea of this paper is that the justification for the role of mental images in the creative process lies in the analysis of the relationship between vision and imagery. Mental images are present in thought just in those situations in which the ideal way to solve a problem would be the perception of those same things before our own eyes. (...) The production of a mental image is, from this point of view, an analogous process to the perception of an object in its absence. In these cases the images become a good substitute for reality: this is possible because they share common structural elements with percepts. These shared common characteristics provide a validation to the idea that the role of imagery in creativity depends on the structural properties which mental images share with the representation of the perceived information. Such a result opens the way to the idea that there is a close link between imagery and vision and, thus, provide justification for the theory that imagery is closer to perceiving than to thinking. (shrink)

In what ways might we best, and justly, allow for cohabitation between individuals and groups with plural conceptions of the good? Confronting this question, students of political philosophy in the past two decades have encountered a routine contrast between liberal universalism, with a focus on equal individual rights and uniform application of the law, and on the other hand various versions of a 'politics of difference'(...).

In a recent paper, ‘Peripersonal perception in action’ (Synthese, 2018), Frédérique de Vignemont tackles the problem of defining what is peculiar to the visual perception of objects falling within the peripersonal space of the observer, i.e. the space immediately surrounding the body, and which is commonly described as the space in which action takes place. In this paper, I first discuss the proposal offered by de Vignemont about what characterizes peripersonal perception. Then, I suggest an extension of this account that (...) offers a meticulous description of the nature of the Content of Peripersonal Visual Experience - a topic never explicitly considered in the philosophical literature on vision - by discussing some peculiar features of it that, as recognized also by de Vignemont’s account, still need to be explained. In particular, I offer a philosophical examination of the specificity of peripersonal visual experience, in relation to its phenomenological dimension, its optical mechanisms and its neurophysiological underpinnings, in the light of our best theories from vision science, and in comparison to the visual experience of other visual spaces. (shrink)

Does action play any crucial role in our perception of pictures? The standard literature on picture perception has never explicitly tackled this question. This is for a simple reason. After all, objects in a picture seem to be static objects of perception. Thus, it might sound extremely controversial to say that action is crucial in picture perception. Contrary to this general intuitive stance, this paper defends, for the first time, the apparently very controversial claim, never addressed in the literature, that (...) some of the specific and essential relations between vision and action make action (and its motoric basis) crucial in order for us to enter pictorial experience. I first discuss two ways in which vision and action are deeply linked, by describing the famous notions of Vision-for-Action and Sensorimotor Understanding. Then, I describe the special role they play in generating ordinary pictorial experience and suggest that, when we cannot rely on them while in front of a picture, we lose pictorial experience. (shrink)

Habitual actions have a history of practice and repetition that frees us from attending to what we are doing. Nevertheless, habitual actions seem to be intentional. What does account for the intentionality of habitual actions if they are automatically performed and controlled? In this paper, we address a possible response to a particular version of this issue, that is, the problem of understanding how the intention to execute a habitual action, which comes in a propositional format, interlocks with motor representations, (...) which come in a motoric-pragmatic format. In order to solve this issue, we propose an account according to which the propositional intentions and the motor representations related to our habitual actions interlock through executable action concepts. This allows us to maintain that habitual actions can be, at the same time, automatically initiated, performed, and controlled and, still, intentional. (shrink)

Toleration classically denotes a relation between two agents that is characterised by three components: objection, power, and acceptance overriding the objection. Against recent claims that classical toleration is not applicable in liberal democracies and that toleration must therefore either be understood purely attitudinally or purely politically, we argue that the components of classical toleration are crucial elements of contemporary cases of minority accommodation. The concept of toleration is applicable to, and is an important element of descriptions of such cases, provided (...) that one views them as wholes, rather than as sets of isolated relations. We explain this by showing how certain cases of toleration are multi‐dimensional and how the descriptive concept of toleration might be understood intersectionally. We exemplify this by drawing on case studies of mosque controversies in Germany and Denmark. Finally, we propose that intersectionality is not only relevant to the descriptive concept of toleration but also captures an important aspect of normative theories of toleration. We illustrate this by discussing ideals of respect‐based toleration, which we also apply to the case studies. (shrink)

Le modèle déductivo-nomologique domine depuis longtemps la réflexion philosophique concernant l’explication en science économique. Or, pour plusieurs, comme James Woodward et Tony Lawson, ce modèle ne considère pas suffisamment la causalité dans l’explication. L’objectif de cet article est double : 1- renforcer la critique que Tony Lawson adresse à l’économie contemporaine et 2- évaluer la théorie alternative qu’il propose, le « réalisme critique », qui tente de réintroduire la causalité dans l’explication en science économique. Nous conclurons que les considérations causales (...) sont très importantes pour l’explication en science économique mais aussi pour bien comprendre les limites de cette science. (shrink)

Este trabalho visa a mostrar que se pode identificar uma diretriz metodológica a qual guia as especulações de Freud em Além do princípio do prazer e que foi concebida pelo autor no manuscrito de 1895 Projeto de uma psicologia. Ela se prestou a criar condições para o recurso a explicações de ordem ontogenética e filogenética para os fenômenos detectados pela clínica freudiana. A fim de mostrar esses aspectos, primeiramente se resgata a referida diretriz em Projeto de uma psicologia e se (...) a identifica, em seguida, em Além do princípio do prazer com vistas a, enfim, buscar fornecer contribuições não apenas ao esclarecimento dos recursos freudianos à filogênese e à ontogênese como também ao vislumbre da importância desses domínios na metapsicologia freudiana e das possibilidades de relação entre a psicanálise e a biologia que se abrem a partir desse belo e desafiador ensaio de Freud escrito a um século. (shrink)

This volume features new research about the philosophy of plant intelligence and plant cognition, one of the most intriguing and complex current debates at the intersection of biology, cognitive science and philosophy. The debate about plant cognition is marked by deep disagreements. Some theorists are confident that the empirical evidence supports the ascription of cognitive capacities to plants. Others hold that such claims are overblown, and defend more traditional, non-cognitive accounts of plant behavior. Still others seek to formulate intermediate positions. (...) This volume brings together leading researchers from across this theoretical spectrum to tackle the foundational questions that are at issue in the debate about plant cognition. The contributions focus on the philosophical questions raised by recent discoveries and controversies in the empirical sciences, such as: Can plants be said to have genuine cognitive abilities? Can they be characterized as representing or perceiving their environment, as pursuing goals, or even as having some form of conscious experience? Which data could provide evidence for such characterizations? And what are possible implications of these issues for general questions about the nature of cognition, representation, perception, and consciousness? Philosophy of Plant Cognition will be of interest to scholars and students working in philosophy of mind, philosophy of biology, cognitive science, and plant biology. (shrink)

Using ethnographic data from rural Northeast Brazil, this article explores, firstly, how climate uncertainties are interconnected to processes of accountability and blame, and, secondly, how this connection affects the activity of climate forecasting. By framing climate events in ways that downplay the inherent uncertainties of the atmosphere, political discourses on various scales, as well as religious narratives, create a propitious context for the enactment of what I call accountability rituals. Forecasters seem to attract to themselves a great deal of the (...) collective anxieties related to climate, and are very often blamed for the negative impact of climate events. This blaming may take place in a variety of ways, and has a range of practical results: from real physical violence to attacks on the authority and legitimacy of forecasters, by way of ridicule and jokes. I conclude by suggesting that, on the one hand, the study of the social uses of climate-related uncertainties offers special opportunities for understanding how human societies deal with uncertainty and blame; and that, on the other hand, a better understanding of these issues is necessary to improve relations between climate forecasting and the societies where it takes place ? the latter being a key issue in the processes of understanding and adapting to climate change. (shrink)

There are many situations and policies that strike us as unjust and make us look for alternatives. Yet in the absence of a clear definition, we may end up by equating injustice with everything that is evil in the world.

Digital technologies hold promise to modernize healthcare. Such opportunity should be leveraged also to address the needs of rapidly ageing populations. Against this backdrop, this paper examines the use of wearable devices for promoting healthy ageing. Previous work has assessed the prospects of digital technologies for health promotion and disease prevention in older adults. However, to our knowledge, ours is one of the first attempts to specifically address the use of wearables for healthy ageing, and to offer ethical insights for (...) assessing the prospects of leveraging wearable devices in this context. We provide an analysis of the considerable opportunities associated with the use of wearables for healthy ageing, with a focus on the five domains of intrinsic capacity: locomotion, sensory functions, psychological aspects, cognition, and vitality. We then highlight current limitations and ethical challenges of such approach to healthy ageing, including issues related to access, inclusion, privacy, surveillance, autonomy, and regulation. We conclude by discussing the implications of our analysis in light of current debates on the ethics of digital health, and suggest measures to address the identified challenges. (shrink)

What mental states are required for an agent to know-how to perform an action? This question fuels one of the hottest debates in the current literature on philosophy of action. Answering this question means facing what we call here The Challenge of Format Dualism, which consists in establishing which is the format of the mental representations involved in practical knowledge and, in case they are given in more than one format, explaining how these different formats can interlock. This challenge has (...) generated two parallel debates: the debate between Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism on the one hand, and the debate on the Interface Problem on the other. While the former is about whether practical knowledge can be considered a species of propositional knowledge, the latter investigates how motoric and propositional states can be related. Here we offer a unified account capable of explicitly analyzing those two problems within the same philosophical framework. Our account suggests a new way for solving the Interface Problem that paves the way for addressing the debate between Intellectualism and Anti-Intellectualism. (shrink)

When seeing a jaguar, we can see all the spots on its mantle without seeing a determinate number, N, of spots on the mantle. How is this visual phenomenon possible? Philosophers have tried to provide a reliable answer to this question, by recruiting evidence from vision science about the way attention works. Here we push this idea forward, by suggesting that an alternative and less complex solution, with respect to the one proposed in the literature, is possible. In particular, we (...) argue that the puzzling visual phenomenon of 'seeing entities without seeing N-entities' strictly depends on the specific number of entities we are simultaneously attending to: a problematic scenario concerning this visual process arises only when the number of entities in the visual field exceeds a specific quantity. This depends, as we argue, on the fact that the nature of our visual content is modulated, in this perceptual scenario, by the limited way we can exercise visual attention on the properties of the objects of our perception. Differently from other accounts, our proposal allows us to properly define when and why such a problem arises, and explains why such a situation has traditionally been found to be so puzzling. Our idea is also well motivated by experimental results that so far have not been taken into account in the debate. (shrink)

Toleration classically denotes a relation between two agents that is characterised by three components: objection, power, and acceptance overriding the objection. Against recent claims that classical toleration is not applicable in liberal democracies and that toleration must therefore either be understood purely attitudinally or purely politically, we argue that the components of classical toleration are crucial elements of contemporary cases of minority accommodation. The concept of toleration is applicable to, and is an important element of descriptions of such cases, provided (...) that one views them as wholes, rather than as sets of isolated relations. We explain this by showing how certain cases of toleration are multi-dimensional and how the descriptive concept of toleration might be understood intersectionally. We exemplify this by drawing on case studies of mosque controversies in Germany and Denmark. Finally, we propose that intersectionality is not only relevant to the descriptive concept of toleration but also captures an important aspect of normative theories of toleration. We illustrate this by discussing ideals of respect-based toleration, which we also apply to the case studies. (shrink)

In this paper we propose a narrative hypothesis on the nature of language and a proto-discursive hypothesis on the origin of our communicative abilities. Our proposal is based on two assumptions. The first assumption, concerning the properties of language, is tied to the idea that global discourse coherence governs the origin of our communicative abilities as well the functioning of these abilities. The second assumption, concerning processing devices, is connected to the idea that the systems of spatial and temporal navigation (...) are implicated in discourse coherence processing. Analysis of the relationship between these two assumptions allows us to integrate the model of language based on clues proposed by Sperber and Wilson with Relevance Theory with the discursive foundation of human communication. In this respect, our proposal can be considered as a tentative extension of Relevance Theory. (shrink)

Philosophers and cognitive scientists have been debating about the nature of practical knowledge in skilled action. A big challenge is that of establishing whether and how practical knowledge (knowledge-how) is influenced by, or related to propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). This becomes even more challenging when trying to understand how propositional and motor representations may cooperate in making action performance flexible, while also remaining rational. In this paper, we offer an account that explains how practical knowledge leads to the execution of our (...) actions in a way that accounts for its relation to propositional knowledge, and with respect to the possibility of granting flexibility and rationality. (shrink)

The main intent of this paper is to give an account of the relationship between bio-cognition and culture in terms of coevolution, analysing religious beliefs and language evolution as case studies. The established view in cognitive studies is that bio-cognitive systems constitute a constraint for the shaping and the transmission of religious beliefs and linguistic structures. From this point of view, religion and language are by-products or exaptations of processing systems originally selected for other cognitive functions. We criticize such a (...) point of view, showing that it paves the way for the idea that cultural evolution follows a path entirely autonomous and independent from that of biological evolution. Against the by-product and exaptation approaches, our idea is that it is possible to interpret religion and language in terms of coevolution. The concept of coevolution involves a dual path of constitution: one for which biology (cognition) has adaptive effects on culture, the other for which, in turn, forms of culture have adaptive effects on biology (cognition). This dual path of constitution implies that religion and language are (at least in some aspects) forms of biological adaptations. (shrink)